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Individuals in crowded theaters, stadiums and lecture halls know that they attend to 
the events on the stage, on the field, and at the podium with others. Extending the 
literature on social foundations of knowledge formation, Social Attention Theory 
posits that knowingly attending to a stimulus with one’s group renders that stimulus 
more cognitively accessible in memory. The theory is tested across three studies 
where participants attend to stimuli such as words (study 1), goals (study 2), and time 
pressure (study 3) with members of their group or a control group. Across all three 
experiments, participants exhibited greater cognitive accessibility for he stimuli 
attended to with their group (i.e., similar others). Results also showed that individuals 
felt more social when attending to stimuli with their group, but did not feel happier, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
From living rooms to public squares, individuals are keenly interested in one 
another’s knowledge and experiences. Recognizing this fact, psychologists have long 
studied the social process by which knowledge is formed (James, 1907). Indeed, more 
than a century of scholarship suggests that individuals’ beliefs and attitudes are to a 
large extent rooted in their social group memberships (Asch, 1951; Festinger, 1950, 
1954; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; Latané, 1996; Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991, 1999). In 
particular, the social verification perspective (Festinger, 1950, 1954), the principal 
theoretical pillar of social influence scholarship, posits that individuals adopt th se 
beliefs and attitudes that are shared within their reference groups. Making a s milar 
argument, Self-categorization Theory (Turner, 1991) posits that the beliefs and 
attitudes that are seen as typical of one’s social group are experienced as vali . As 
such, with considerable implications for the dynamics of social reality construction, 
experiences of shared beliefs and attitudes have been regarded as powerful 
psychological foundations upon which individuals come to understand reality—an 
understanding that in turn forms a basis for action (Festinger, 1950; Hardin & 
Higgins, 1996). 
Still, despite the impressive theoretical reach of the social verification nd 
self-categorization, these perspectives limit social foundations of knowledge 
formation to the beliefs and attitudes that are experienced as shared. This dissertation 
proposes that the social foundations of knowledge formation are more pervasive than 
these theories allow.  
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Both emerging and diverging from the above perspectives, Social Attention 
Theory posits that groups change the way in which individuals remember stimuli in 
their attentional field. Specifically, the theory proposes that the experienc  of 
attending to a stimulus with one’s group results in greater cognitive accessibility of 
that stimulus. For instance, an individual that is attending to a word may believe that 
his or her group is also attending to that word. The theory posits that, knowingly 
attending to a word with one’s group renders that word more cognitively accessible. 
More formally, Social Attention Theory consists of the following four 
assumptions. Assumption 1:The experience of social attention on a stimulus requires 
that the individual thinks that others are attending to the same stimulus as he or she 
(others may not actually be attending). Assumption 2: The experience of social 
attention on a stimulus requires that the others attending to the stimulus are perceived 
to be members of one’s group. Assumption 3: The extent to which the individual 
thinks that members of one’s group are attending to the stimulus, the stimulus is 
rendered more cognitively accessible in memory. Assumption 4: The theory applies to 
any stimulus from any sensory system hat can be represented in memory.  
The dissertation proceeds as follows: First, the extant literature on the social 
bases of knowledge formation is reviewed, with a focus on the social verification and 
self-categorization perspectives (Chapter 2). Next, the theoretical rationale for social 
attention as a psychological mechanism of knowledge formation is presented, with a 
focus on the role of social attention in intra-group coordination and inter-group 
competition, its influence on early development and learning, and its possible neural 
bases in the brain (Chapter 3). To test Social Attention Theory, three studies are 
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described that examine the influence of social attention on the cognitive accessibility 
of words, goals, and time pressure (Chapter 4). Finally, the implications of Social
Attention Theory for social influence scholarship as well as the psychological field in 
general are discussed (Chapter 5).  
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Chapter 2: The Social Bases of Knowledge Formation 
Writing at the end of the 19th century Durkheim (1893/1984) argued that 
shared states “…stand radically apart from the rest of our consciousness, where other 
states are much weaker. They dominate us, they possess, so to speak, something 
superhuman about them” (p. 56). In the 20th century, the assumption that social 
processes underpin knowledge formation has been made forcefully by many iconic 
theorists (Asch 1952; Festinger, 1950; James 1907; Kuhn, 1962; Mead, 1934; 
Moscovici, 1976; Searle, 1995; Sherif, 1936; Vygotsky, 1978). Indeed, the notion that 
individual experiences of reality are socially constituted is also the linchpin of social 
psychological scholarship. However, despite the widespread scholarly attention to the 
topic, there have been surprisingly few psychological accounts of how groups 
influence knowledge formation. Two highly influential exceptions are the theories of 
Social Verification (Festinger, 1950; 1954) and Self-categorization (Turner, 1991), 
which together form our present-day understanding of knowledge formation in 
groups, are discussed next.  
Social Verification Theory 
Festinger (1950) argued that knowledge formation in groups is driven by the 
need to establish an agreed-upon corpus of knowledge upon which groups can 
locomote towards a valued goal. The key contribution of Social Verification Theory 
is to posit a specific psychological mechanism by which groups influence knowledge 
formation as to increase knowledge uniformity among their members. 
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Festinger (1950) proposed that “…a belief, an attitude is ‘correct,’ ‘valid,’ and 
‘proper’ to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people…” (p. 272-273). Social 
Verification Theory suggests that because group members strive to gain and maintain 
a psychological experience of agreement with one another, group settings facilitate 
both knowledge formation within individuals and knowledge uniformity across 
individuals. More specifically, in their desire to reach consensus, group members 
internalize the beliefs and attitudes that are experienced as shared within the group. 
Although Social Verification Theory details the conditions under which 
groups influence knowledge formation in their members (e.g., uncertainty), the theory 
does not address why individuals come to trust certain groups, but not others. The 
question of how we choose our groups is of utmost importance as according to 
Festinger (1950), “It is clearly not necessary for the validity of someone’s pinion 
that everyone else in the world think the way he does. It is only necessary that the 
members of that group to which he refers this opinion or attitude think the way he 
does” (p. 273). To simply say that individuals select groups based upon their 
trustworthiness is to compound the problem. That is, within the framework of the 
social verification perspective, there is no independent way to assess the 
trustworthiness of a group without seeking further social verification, which of course 
leaves us with our original question—how do individuals decide whom to trust?  
Self-categorization Theory 
The most widely accepted answer to the above question was forwarded by the 
social identity approach which is comprised of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) and Self-categorization Theory (Turner, 1991, 1999; Turner, Hogg, 
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Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Because Self-categorization Theory is 
specifically targeted to explain group influence on knowledge formation (Turner, 
1991,1999), it will be the focus of the discussion.  
Self-categorization Theory posits that a person’s “cognitive redefinition of the 
self” in a social category (Turner, 1984, p. 528) has a profound effect on cognition. 
Namely, self-categorization in a group leads to the experience of that group’s beliefs 
and attitudes as one’s own, since on the psychological level, that group and its beliefs 
and attitudes become the self (Turner, 1999). To the question of when an individual 
self-categorizes in a group, the theory’s meta-contrast principle is the answer. The 
principle proposes that the individual will self-categorize into a given group when the 
average differences between the self and the members of that group are lessthan the 
average differences between the self and the remaining stimuli in one’s frame of 
reference (Turner, 1999). As such, Self-categorization Theory provides a cognitively-
oriented answer to why individuals adopt certain group identities and their associated 
beliefs and attitudes.  
In sum, Social Verification and Self-categorization theories are highly 
complementary. While the social verification perspective introduced the notion that 
beliefs and attitudes that are experienced as shared with one’s group are seen as valid, 
the self-categorization perspective detailed the cognitive machinery that helps an 
individual decide which group is his or her own. Both perspectives posit that 
knowledge formation depends on the experience of sharing beliefs and attitudes with 
one’s group. Next, Social Attention Theory is compared to the scholarship reviewed. 
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The theory is argued to both emerge and diverge from the extant social psychological 
accounts of knowledge formation.  
Social Attention Theory 
Like the theories reviewed, Social Attention Theory is rooted in the idea that 
individual knowledge is socially constituted. Like the social verification perspective, 
the theory forwards a psychological mechanism that functions to facilitate the 
formation of uniform knowledge within a group, based upon which a group can 
locomote towards its valued goals. Also, like the self-categorization perspective, the 
theory posits that individual identification with a social group is of fundamental 
importance to knowledge formation. However, unlike both perspectives reviewed, 
Social Attention Theory does not account for knowledge formation in terms of shared 
beliefs and attitudes.    
Social Attention Theory proposes a simple but powerful psychological 
mechanism that drives individual knowledge formation in group settings. The 
mechanism is based on the notion that individuals are not only aware of the beliefs 
and attitudes that they share with their group, but are also cognizant of the stimuli that 
they attend to with their group. While we know that the beliefs and attitudes that are 
shared with one’s group are more likely to be internalized, we do not yet know 
whether the attentional targets that are experienced as shared with one’s gr up are 
more likely to be remembered. Notably, Social Attention Theory does not posit that 
this effect is simply a result of imitating the attentional focus of one’s group. Rather, 
it is the cognizance that we are attending to the stimulus which results in greater 
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prominence of that stimulus in memory. In the remainder of the introduction, the case 
for Social Attention Theory is put forth. 
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Chapter 3: The Case for Social Attention  
Social Attention and Group Locomotion 
Psychologists have argued that like biological structures, universal cognitive 
structures are also a result of evolution by natural selection and can be traced to the 
selection pressures faced by early hominids in the Pleistocene epoch (Cosmides, 
Tooby, & Barkow, 1992). Arguably, human cognitive mechanisms developed at a 
time when individual survival fully depended on participation in collaborative 
activities such as food gathering, game hunting, shelter maintenance and enemy 
repulsion (Wilson & Wilson, 2007). If individual survival was yoked to his or her 
group’s survival, it is likely that psychological adaptations that enhanced individual 
attunement to the group, the level of the within-group coordination and hence the 
group’s aptitude for inter-group competition, would afford a natural selection 
advantage (Sober & Wilson, 1998).  
Of course, one such cognitive adaptation is forwarded by the social 
verification and self-categorization perspectives—that is group members’ greater 
internalization of beliefs and attitudes that are experienced as shared. However, 
beliefs and attitudes comprise just a fraction of information that can be experienced as 
shared with one’s group. Indeed, it is likely that people are more aware of the objects 
that they attend to in common (We see X) than the shared beliefs and attitudes about 
those attentional targets (We think Y about X). If group members have better mmory 
for objects that they knowingly attend to in common, the result would be greater 
knowledge uniformity within the group.  
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In sum, if a psychological mechanism could increase knowledge uniformity 
across a group of individuals, it would possess a selective advantage for an organism 
that survives through effective intra-group coordination and inter-group competition. 
The social attention effect on stimuli accessibility is one such mechanism. I  what 
follows, the case for social attention is further developed through a review of the 
developmental literature on joint attention behavior, and the social neuroscience 
scholarship on shared attentional states.  
Social Attention and Development 
Based on a comprehensive review of developmental research, Tomasello, 
Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005) concluded that as soon as 9 months of age, 
infants engage in joint attention behavior, involving multiple people directing their 
attention toward a common activity (e.g., we are putting away toys). “During these 
activities, infants’ looking becomes coordinated with that of the other person 
triadically towards the relevant outside objects…”(p. 682).  
Thus, already at this early stage of development, humans are engaged in 
shared activities, requiring cognitive adaptations that allow for persistnt joint 
attention behavior (Mundy & Newell, 2007). There is a significant amount of 
evidence that joint attention behavior is an important antecedent to referential 
language ability (Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998), as well as infant vocabulary 
(Morales et al., 1998). Whereas, there is substantial evidence that children with 
autistic learning disabilities are unable to join in with another person’s attentional 
focus (Leekam, Lopez & Moore, 2000). An important question then, is what are 
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psychological adaptations that enable infants to engage in persistent joint attention 
behavior?  
A generally-accepted answer in the developmental literature is that infants 
possess a shared attention mechanism (Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1996); the 
purpose of which “…is to identify if you and another organism are both attending to 
the same object or event” (p. 159). As such, it appears that by 9 months of age, 
infants acquire a shared attention mechanism that is uniquely devoted to establishing 
joint attention behavior (Tomasello et al., 2005).  
Moreover, given that infants are capable of joint attention behavior years 
before becoming aware that other people have beliefs and attitudes, the 
developmental literature also makes clear that there is a qualitative difference 
between mental representations of shared stimuli and shared beliefs. Whereas, stimuli 
under shared attention are experienced as external realities that are held in common 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995), shared beliefs are experienced as consensual mental 
representations of reality (Echterhoff et al., in press).  
In sum, the developmental literature supports the notion that humans possess a 
shared attention mechanism that is devoted to processing instances of attending o an 
object with others. Social Attention Theory builds on the idea of the shared attention 
mechanism, but incorporates unique assumptions. First, unlike shared attention that 
involves gaze monitoring (Baron-Cohen, 1995), social attention only requires that the 
individual thinks that others are attending (Assumption 1). Also, unlike shared 
attention that can involve any ‘organism,’ social attention requires that the others 
attending to the stimulus are perceived to be members of one’s group (Assumption 2).  
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The Neural Bases of Social Attention 
At a more basic level, social neuroscience research suggests that human brains 
are uniquely adapted to think socially (Saxe, 2006). Of particular interest is evidence 
suggesting that neural activity in the ventral region of the medial prefrontal cor ex 
(ventral mPFC) is selectively associated with joint attention behavior (Williams, 
Waiter, Perra, Perrett & Whiten, 2005). In this fMRI study, adult participants were 
asked to either look at a ball when another person (an animated character) was 
looking at the ball or when another person was looking in a different direction. There 
appeared to be selective recruitment of the ventral region of the mPFC when the other 
person looked at the ball, but not when the other person looked away. Also, recent 
evidence showing that the ventral mPFC is selectively recruited when thinking about 
similar others (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006) suggests that the brain region 
involved in monitoring for shared attention is also active in the presence of similar 
others. These findings are consistent with Social Attention Theory’s assumption that 
experiences of shared attention involve estimations of whether the others are 
members of one’s group.  
Interestingly, in a review of the literature, Saxe (2006) concludes that whereas 
the mental representations of others’ beliefs are processed in the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), mental representations of stimuli under shared attention are processed 
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). It appears that humans possess a sp cialized 
brain region geared for the experience of objects in common.  
In sum, both developmental evidence and imaging studies suggest that 
experiences of shared attention are processed by a specialized cognitive mechanism. 
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Combined with the notion that a certain level of knowledge uniformity among group 
members is necessary for group locomotion and survival, it is conceivable that 
humans possess a psychological adaptation, rooted in the experience of shared 
attention, that drives knowledge formation. Next, three experimental studies test the 
assumptions of Social Attention Theory. More specifically, the studies test the 
hypothesis that knowingly attending to a stimulus with members of one’s group (e.g., 
similar others) results in greater cognitive accessibility of that stimulus. 
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Chapter 4: Testing Social Attention Theory 
The primary goal of the three studies was to compare the cognitive 
accessibility of stimuli that were attended to with one’s group members versus a 
control group. Although the details of each study’s manipulation differ, in all studies 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they either attended to 
stimuli with one’s group (i.e., similar others) or a control group. Importantly, the 
invoked social groups were minimal. That is, the primed social groups were meant to 
have relatively few associated attitudes and/or beliefs, which were not related to the 
target stimuli. Moreover, across all studies, participants were separated into different 
rooms, with no ability to communicate. As such, participants could not simply imitate 
the attentional intensity of others since they could not see them. Whereas multiple 
study cues reminded participants that they were attending to the stimuli with others, 
the participants could not observe the extent to which others attended to the stimuli.  
Following the key manipulation of whether one’s group was attending or not, 
participants were presented with target stimuli, the cognitive accessibility of which 
was measured through participants’ psychological and behavioral reactions. Given the 
central assumption of the theory tested, the dependent variable of primary interest 
was the cognitive accessibility of the presented stimuli. For instance, in the first 
study, participants attended to words with others, the cognitive accessibility of which 
was later measured through word recognition latency (Fazio, 1989) and accuracy. In 
the second study, participants attended to goals with others, the cognitive accessibility 
of which was later measured by the degree of goal-congruent behavior. In the third 
study, while making a judgment, participants attended to time pressure with others, 
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the cognitive accessibility of which was later measured by the degree of judgmental 
certainty (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Please see figure 1 below for a summary of 
all 3 studies.  
Figure 1. Summary of all studies.  
 The choice of the stimuli was strategic. The choice of words as stimuli in the
first study allowed for a direct measure of stimuli cognitive accessibility—word 
recognition latency and accuracy. In the second study, goals were used as stimuli to 









































the third study, time pressure was used as stimuli to demonstrate that social attention 
on certain stimuli can alter judgmental certainty, a psychological outcome of 
considerable importance. Overall, the three studies conducted aimed to provide 
convergent validity for Social Attention Theory across the psychological and 
behavioral domains of memory performance (Study 1), risk behavior (Study 2) and 
judgmental certainty (Study 3).  
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Study 1: Social Attention on Words 
Participants and General Design. Participants were 43 undergraduates (72.1% 
females; mean age = 19.19 years). The first study explored the effect of social 
attention on the cognitive accessibility of words in a between-subjects design with 
two conditions (similar others attending vs. control group attending). Target word 
recognition latency (Fazio, 1989) as well as word recognition accuracy served as the 
dependent variables.  
Hypotheses. It was hypothesized that participants who attended to target 
words with similar others (vs. a control group) would be faster to recognize the target 
words on second appearance (lower recognition latency) (Hypothesis 1). It was also 
hypothesized that participants who attended to target words with similar others(vs. a 
control group) would have greater word recognition accuracy (Hypothesis 2).  
 Procedure and Manipulations. Participants arrived to the laboratory three at a 
time and were placed into separate rooms, with each individual seated in front of a 
computer. Participants were informed that they would be asked to perform a number 
of different tasks, such as forming opinions and playing word games. Importantly, 
throughout the study, participants were made aware that the others were also 
attending to the stimuli presented. This was achieved in several ways: (1) pre-study 
instructions, (2) “waiting for others to join” screens, (3) representation of others on 
the screen, and (4) in-study instructions addressing participants as a group. Notably, 
participants were also told that no sharing of responses among participants would 
occur and all responses would remain confidential. 
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 The presence of similar others attending to the stimuli (words in this case) w  
evoked  in the following manner. Each participant was instructed to begin the study 
by clicking one of five colored avatars. The five avatars were identical exept for the 
difference in the color of their outline: red, blue, green, yellow, orange (Appendix A). 
After choosing their avatar, participants were asked to wait until two other 
participants logged into the study (Appendix B). On the screen that followed, 
participants were asked to judge a painting, which served as a distractor task. 
Simultaneous with the instructions for the distractor task, participants in the similar 
others attending condition saw that all three participants chose identical avatar colors 
(Appendix C); whereas, participants in the control condition saw that all three 
participants chose distinct avatar colors (Appendix D). In reality, the others’ avatar 
colors was controlled by the computer to either match the participant’s color choice 
or mismatch it, depending on the condition of the participant.  
 Importantly, the above manipulation was designed to be subtle as to avoid 
priming psychological states that were extraneous to the theory, such as greater
competitiveness, task enjoyment, and general motivation. To make sure that these 
psychological states did not differ across conditions, 1-item Likert items asked 
participants the extent to which they felt competitive, enjoyed the tasks, and felt 
motivated to perform the tasks.  
 The remainder of the study consisted of a signal detection task in which 
participants were briefly presented with a list of nine five-letter words which served 
as the signal. Participants were then presented with a second series of words, some of 
which they had seen (signal) and others they had not (noise) (Appendix E). 
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Participants were asked to identify whether each word had already appeared or was 
new.  
Results. First, ANOVA analyses did not reveal any differences between 
conditions in self-reported feelings of competitiveness [F = .50 (1, 41), p = .49], task 
enjoyment [F = .19 (1, 41), p = .66], or general motivation to perform the tasks [F = 
.04 (1, 41), p = .84]. To test the effect of condition on speed of word recognition 
(speed of signal detection), we calculated participants’ average time to recognize the 
signal correctly. A between-subjects ANOVA indicated a significant effect of 
condition on speed of word recognition [F = 5.91 (1, 41), p = .02, η2 = .13] with 
participants in the similar other condition having faster recognition times [n = 19; M 
ms = 1079.25, SD ms = 301.95] than participants in the control group condition [n = 
24; M ms  = 1558.36,  SD ms = 814.12]. An independent samples t-test (equal variances 






Figure 2. Study 1 target word recognition latency across conditions.            
Note: Error bars represent standard errors. 
 To test the effect of condition on accuracy of word recognition (signal 
detection), we calculated d’ prime (Z hit rate – Z false alarm rate) (Banks, 1970; 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). A between-subjects ANOVA indicated a significant 
effect of condition on accuracy of word recognition [F = 5.75 (1, 41), p = .02, η2 = 
.12] with participants in the similar other condition exhibiting greater accuray [n = 
19; M d prime  = .68, SD d prime = 1.20] than participants in the control group condition  
[n = 24; M d prime = -.54, SD d prime = 1.94]. An independent samples t-test (equal 
variances not assumed) confirmed the finding [t = -2.53 (38.97), p = .02] (See Figure 





Figure 3. Study 1 word recognition accuracy across conditions.             
Note: Error bars represent standard errors. 
Post-hoc Analyses. A more in-depth analysis of hit rates and false alarm rates 
showed that the difference in the overall accuracy (d prime) between conditions was 
attributable to a higher proportion of hits in the similar others attending condition (H t 
rate= 72%) as compared to the control group attending condition (Hit rate= 60%) [t = 
-2.22 (40.80), p = .03] as well as a lower proportion of false alarms in the similar 
others attending condition (False alarm rate = 7%) as compared to the controlgroup 
attending condition (False alarm rate = 22%) [t = 2.12 (34.08), p = .04].  
Discussion. In sum, the results support the hypothesis that stimuli that are 
attended to in the company of one’s group (i.e., similar others) are more cognitively 
accessible or memorable. It appears that simply knowing that one’s group is attending 
to target words heightens the words’ cognitive accessibility, leading to faster and 
more accurate word recognition. In the next study, regulatory focus goals are u ed as 
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stimuli to demonstrate that social attention on more complex stimuli such as goals can 
heighten goal-congruent behavior. 
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Study 2: Social Attention on Regulatory Goals 
Participants and General Design. Participants were 109 undergraduates 
(67.9% females; mean age = 19.4 years). The second study explored the effect of 
social attention on the cognitive accessibility of regulatory focus goals in  2 (similar 
others attending vs. control group attending) by 2 (promotion regulatory goal vs. 
prevention regulatory goal) between-subjects design. Like the first study, the second 
study consisted of a signal detection task in which participants were asked to d cide 
whether the word was previously seen (signal) or if the word was new (noise). 
However, unlike in the first study, the second study also presented participants with 
either promotion or prevention goals (Higgins, 1998). The level of behavioral risk 
was the dependent variable of interest as it is a well-researched outcome of regulatory 
focus orientation, with promotion goals leading to more risky behavior than 
prevention goals (for a review see Higgins, 1998). Moreover, because the regulatory 
focus goals were primed in the context of a word recognition task, the effect of 
similar others attending on word recognition accuracy was also examined.  
 Hypotheses. It was expected that the influence of regulatory focus goals on 
behavioral risk would be greater in the similar others (vs. control group) attending 
condition due to greater cognitive accessibility of regulatory focus goals. More 
specifically, given the hypothesis that the attentional targets of one’s group are more 
cognitively accessible, we expected that participants who attended to the promotion 
goal (vs. prevention goal) with similar others would be more risky in their response 
style. Conversely, we expected that participants who attended to the promotion (vs. 
prevention goal) with the control group would exhibit little difference in response 
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style risk (Hypothesis 1). Since regulatory focus goals were primed in the context of a 
word recognition task, and words under social attention are expected to be more 
cognitively accessible, it was hypothesized that participants in the similar others (vs. 
control group) attending condition would be more accurate when identifying the 
words as previously seen or as new (Hypothesis 2). Because response bias (c 
criterion) and recognition accuracy (d prime) are orthogonal in signal detection tasks, 
both hypotheses 1 and 2 can theoretically find support. It was not expected that 
participants in the similar others (vs. control group) attending condition would be 
faster in identifying target words, since greater promotion or prevention concerns 
would likely hamper response speed.  
 Procedure and Manipulations. The initial procedure and the manipulation of 
similar others (vs. control group) attending was identical to that of study 1. However, 
unlike in study 1, before performing the signal detection task, the participants were 
presented with a regulatory focus manipulation (adapted from Crowe & Higgins, 
1997; Levine, Higgins & Choi, 2000). Specifically, participants were first asked to 
look at a series of nine five-letter, nonsense words (targets) (Appendix F), which ere 
shown one at a time for two seconds each. Next, depending on their regulatory focus 
condition, participants saw instructions that either primed a promotion or prevention 
regulatory goal: 
Promotion goal: “You will be asked to identify which words you have already 
seen and which words are new. Your goal is to be correct at least 80% of the 
time.”  
 
Prevention goal: “You will be asked to identify which words you have already 
seen and which words are new. Your goal is to avoid being incorrect more 
than 20% of the time.” 
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In keeping with previous regulatory focus studies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; 
Levine, Higgins & Choi, 2000) the conditions used the same success criterion (at 
least 80% correct), but differed in the regulatory framing of that criterion (i.e., 
approach versus avoidance). Next, in a word recognition task, participants saw twenty 
nonsense words (nine targets, eleven distractors) one at a time (see Appendix F). The 
sequence of the words was randomized within participants. For each word, 
participants were asked to indicate whether the word appeared on the initial list of 
words or whether it was a new word.  
Of primary interest was the riskiness exhibited in participants’ response bia . 
In a comparison of response bias measures within the signal detection paradigm, 
Macmillan & Creelman (1990) concluded that the indexes of criterion location are 
appropriate representations of response bias. Indexes of criterion location are slightly 
different versions of calculating the proportion of correct hits plus false alarms. One 
of the most important features of the criterion location as a response bias measure is 
that it satisfies the monotonicity condition, which implies that accuracy does not 
impact response bias. That is as accuracy goes up (more hits, fewer false alarm rates) 
or down (fewer hits, more false alarm rates), the response bias (# of hits plus # of 
false alarms) remains the same. As such, in testing hypothesis 1, participants’ 
behavioral risk was captured by their c criterion (-0.5*[z hit rate + z false larm rate]) 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1990). Moreover, as in study 1, participants’ accuracy ws 
captured by their d prime scores (Z hit rate – Z false alarm rate) (Banks, 1970).  
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 Also, as in study 1, to make sure that these psychological states did not differ 
across conditions, 1-item Likert items asked participants the extent to which they felt 
competitive, enjoyed the tasks and felt motivated to perform the tasks.  
Results. Three participants in the similar others attending condition were 
excluded from the analyses due to mistakenly believing that other participants chose 
different avatar colors. As such, the reported results are based on 106 participants. As 
in study 1, ANOVA analyses did not reveal any differences between similar vs. 
control group attending conditions in self-reported feelings of competitiveness [F = 
.17 (1, 104), p = .68], task enjoyment [F = .20 (1, 104), p = .66], or general 
motivation to perform the tasks [F = .48 (1, 104), p = .49]. 
A two-way interaction was expected where participants in the similar others 
(vs. control group) attending condition would exhibit more risky behavior in the 
promotion goal condition and more conservative behavior in the prevention goal 
condition. A 2 by 2 between-subjects ANOVA indicated that there was no main effect 
of social attention condition [F = .00 (1, 102), p = .95] or regulatory goal condition [F 
= 2.87 (1, 102), p = .09]. Albeit the latter main effect was close to significance with 
promotion goals eliciting more risky behavior than prevention goals. The 
hypothesized two-way interaction was significant [F = 4.22 (1, 102), p = .04, η2= 
.044]. As expected, promotion/prevention goals had a significant effect on behavioral 
risk for participants sharing attention with similar others (equal variances ot 
assumed) [t (43.76) = -3.06, p = .004], with participants exhibiting more risky 
behavior after promotion goals [n = 25 ; M c crit =    -.19, SD c crit = .50], than after 
prevention goals [n = 22 ; M c crit = .20, SD c crit = .37]. Promotion/prevention goals did 
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not impact behavioral risk for participants in the control condition (equal variances 
not assumed) [t (53.76) = .24, p = .82].  
Notably, the calculation of criterion c involves a negation, which makes lower




Figure 4. Study 2 Two-way interaction on behavioral risk.                                     
Note: Error bars represent standard errors 
As posited by hypothesis 2, participants in the similar others attending 
condition were expected to exhibit greater accuracy in the word recognition task. An 
independent samples t-test (equal variances not assumed) was border-line significant 
[t = -1.90 (103.35), p = .06]. Participants in the similar others attending condition 
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were more accurate [n = 47; M d prime = .33, SD d prime = 1.36], than participants in the 
control group attending condition [n = 59; M d prime = -.26, SD  d prime = 1.86]. No other 
significant effects on word recognition accuracy were found. There were no 
significant effects for word recognition latency.  
Post-hoc Analyses. As predicted, participants in the similar others attending 
condition exhibited greater response biases as well as greater response accuracy. It is 
important to note that participants following promotion strategies in the similar others 
(vs. control group) attending condition should be expected to achieve greater 
accuracy through increasing their hit rate, not increasing their false al rm rate. This 
should be the case because greater accuracy with a promotion strategy can 
theoretically only be achieved through a higher hit rate (i.e., correct ‘yes’ responses). 
Conversely, participants following prevention strategies in the similar others (vs. 
control group) attending condition should be expected to achieve greater accuracy 
through decreasing their false alarm rate, not decreasing their hit rate. This should be 
the case because greater accuracy with a prevention strategy can theoretically only be 
achieved through a lower false alarm rate (i.e., correct ‘no’ responses).  
Indeed, additional analyses reveal that this was exactly the case. Participants 
who were primed with a promotion goal in the similar others (vs. control group) 
attending condition had a higher hit rate [t = 2.08 (39.38), p = .04; hit rate = 96% vs. 
90%], but not a higher false alarm rate [t = -.15 (49.80), p = .88; false alarm rate = 
21% vs. 22%]. Note that the promotion focus in the similar others (vs. control group) 
attending condition does not lead to a greater false alarm rate. This can be explained 
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by the notion that the effect of the promotion strategy on the false alarm rate is
counterbalanced by a better overall memory for the words.  
Conversely, participants who were primed with a prevention goal in the 
similar others (vs. control group) attending condition had a lower false alarm rate [t = 
-2.20 (44.03), p = .03; false alarm rate = 13% vs. 21%], but not a lower hit rate [t = 
.49 (47.99), p = .63; hit rate = 92% vs. 91%]. Again, it is noteworthy that the 
prevention focus in the similar others (vs. control group) attending condition does not 
lead to a lower hit rate. This again can be explained by the idea that the effect of the 
prevention strategy on the hit rate is counterbalanced by a better overall memory for 
the words.  
Discussion. In sum, the results support the hypothesis that stimuli that are 
attended to in the company of one’s group (i.e., similar others) are more cognitively 
accessible or memorable. In a replication of study 1 findings, it appears that simply 
knowing that one’s group is attending to target words heightens the words’ cognitive 
accessibility, leading to greater recognition accuracy. In an important extension, 
however, study 2 shows that simply knowing that one’s group is attending to a 
promotion or a prevention goal heightens the goal’s cognitive accessibility as indexed 
by goal-congruent response behavior. Notably, participants did not have any 
information about what the others thought about the goals or the intensity with which 
the others were attending to the goals. Participants only knew that they were attending 
to the goals with others that were more or less similar to themselves.   
In the next study, time pressure is used as stimuli to demonstrate that social 
attention on certain stimuli can alter judgmental certainty, a psychologica  outcome of 
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considerable importance. Also, in order to more thoroughly refute alternative 
explanations for the findings, participants’ mood and arousal levels were gauged with 
established scales, administered immediately after the manipulation. Moreover, to 
provide further evidence that participants in the similar others attending condition 
experience the presence of relationally-close others, participants’ sociality level (e.g., 
feelings of generosity, feelings of sociability) was measured.  
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Study 3: Social Attention on Time Pressure 
Participants and General Design. Participants were 116 undergraduates 
(49.1% females; mean age = 19.8 years). The third study consisted of a decision-
making task in which participants were asked to decide the nature of a fictitious rebel 
group based on the resistance tactics utilized by the group. The study explored the 
effect of social attention on the cognitive accessibility of time pressu  in a 2 (similar 
others attending vs. control group attending) by 2 (high time pressure vs. low time 
pressure) between-subjects design. That is, during the decision-making process, the 
participants were presented with either high time pressure, which is thought to cause 
more judgmental certainty, or low time pressure, which is thought to cause less 
judgmental certainty (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). 
 Hypothesis. Given the hypothesis that the attentional targets of similar others 
are more cognitively accessible, we expected that participants who attended to high 
time pressure (vs. low time pressure) with similar others would be more certain in 
their judgments of the rebel group. Conversely, we expected that participants who 
attended to high time pressure (vs. low time pressure) with a control group would 
exhibit smaller differences in judgmental certainty (Hypothesis 1).  
Procedure and Manipulations. Participants arrived four at a time and were put 
into different rooms upon everyone’s arrival. Participants were informed that working 
on the computer, they would be asked to report opinions on different topics. 
Participants were also told that while everyone would be reporting into a common 
system, all responses would remain strictly confidential. The social context 
manipulation was similar to that of studies 1 and 2. However, unlike the first two 
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studies where each participant was joined by two others, in the third study, each 
participant was joined by three others. In the similar others attending condition, 
participants were joined by two others that matched their avatar color choice and one 
other that chose a different color from the rest (please see Appendix G). The inclusion 
of one different avatar color was meant to accentuate the similarity of the remaining 
avatar colors for the participant as well as make the situation more believable, since it 
is highly unlikely that four participants would choose the same avatar color. In the
control group attending condition, each participant was joined by three others, all 
with distinct avatar colors (see Appendix H). As in studies 1 and 2, this manipulation 
was concurrent with the abstract painting task, which again served as a distractor.  
Immediately following the social attention manipulation, participants 
answered several scales about how they felt at the time, including PANAS (Watson, 
Clark & Tellegen, 1988), Perceived Arousal Scale (Anderson, Deuser, DeNeve, 
1995), as well as a Sociality Scale (5 items: social, sociable, generous, hospitable, 
unsocial-reversed) (Positive Affect α = .90; Negative Affect α = .88; Arousal Scale α
=  .92; Sociality Scale α = .85). The latter served as a manipulation check. 
Participants in the similar other condition were expected to feel more social given the 
presence of their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
The remainder of the study consisted of a time pressure manipulation 
(Kruglanski & Freund, 1983) in the context of a decision making task. The decision 
making task involved reading a description of a rebel group and deciding whether the 
rebel group is committing acts of terror or not (see Appendix I). Before reading the 
details of the rebel group however, depending on their time pressure condition, 
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participants either saw instructions that primed high time pressure or low time 
pressure: 
 
High Time Pressure: “You will have only 3 minutes to decide.”  
 
Low Time Pressure: “You can take as long as 3 minutes to decide.” 
 
Also, in the high time pressure condition, there was a clearly visible clock that 
was counting up as participants contemplated their decision. The clock was absent in 
the low time pressure condition.  
Of primary interest was the judgmental certainty exhibited by the partici nts, 
measured by the following two items (1-11 scale):  “Would you be surprised to find 
out that your opinion is incorrect?” “Do you have any doubts about your opinion?” 
(reverse-scored) (Cronbach α = .82).  
Results. Participants in the similar others (vs. control group) attending 
condition did not feel happier [F = 1.20 (1, 114), p = .28], sadder [F = .003 (1, 104), p 
= .96], or more aroused F = .02 (1, 114), p = .90], but they did feel more social [F = 
4.21 (114), p = .04](M similar = 3.67 vs. M control = 3.39). 
A two-way interaction was expected where participants in the similar others 
(vs. control group) attending condition would exhibit more judgmental certainty in 
the high time pressure condition and less judgmental certainty in the low time 
pressure condition. A 2 by 2 between-subjects ANOVA indicated that there was no 
main effect of similar others (vs. control group) attending condition [F = .03 (1, 112), 
p = .87] or time pressure condition [F = .07 (1, 112), p = .79]. As hypothesized, the 
two-way interaction was significant [F = 5.62 (1, 112), p = .02, η2= .048]. As 
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expected, high/low time pressure had a significant effect on judgmental certainty for 
participants in similar others attending condition (equal variances not assumed) [t 
(49.11) = 2.08, p = .04], with participants exhibiting more judgmental certainty after 
high time pressure [n = 31 ; M certain = 6.66, SD certain = 1.96], than after low time 
pressure [n = 26 ; M certain = 5.46, SD certain = 2.33]. High/low time pressure did not 
impact judgmental certainty for participants in the control condition (equal vari nces 
not assumed) [t (56.51) = -1.39, p = .17] (See Figure 5 below). 
 
Figure 5. Study 3 Two-way interaction on judgmental certainty.             
Note: Error bars represent standard errors 
Notably, there were no significant main effects or interactions that predicted 
whether participants thought the group was engaged in terrorist resistance tactics.
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That is, whereas the two-way interaction between social attention and time pressure 
conditions influenced participants’ judgmental certainty, it did not effect the direction 
of the participants’ judgments.  
Interestingly, as can be seen on figure 5, the pattern of findings in the control 
group attending condition is the opposite of what would be expected by the Need for 
Closure Theory (Kruglanski, 1989). However, this difference is not statistic lly 
significant (equal variances not assumed) [t (56.51) = 1.39, p = .17].  
Also of interest are the results of the measures gathered directly following the 
social attention manipulation (i.e., positive affect, negative affect, arousal, soci lity). 
The results suggest that the reported judgmental certainty findings were not due to 
differences in affect or arousal. However, the difference in the felt sociality across 
conditions does suggest that participants felt relationally closer to the others in the 
similar others (vs. control group) attending condition.  
 Discussion. In sum, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that stimuli 
attended to with similar others are more cognitively accessible. In study 3 this was 
represented by the greater cognitive accessibility of high and low time pressure 
during decision-making as measured by participants’ certainty in judgment.  
Notably, in both study 2 and study 3, the presented stimuli (i.e., regulatory 
goals and time pressure) produced little difference in the dependent variable when the 
control group was attending. Although this is not directly relevant to testing Social 
Attention Theory, these findings are unexpected given previous scholarship (e.g., 
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Levine, Higgins & Choi, 2000). It is possible that 
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compared to previous research, these studies employed more subtle manipulations 
and offered fewer rewards for participation (i.e., credit vs. monetary payment).  
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
In the three studies presented, attending to simple words, regulatory focus 
goals, and time pressure with similar others, versus a control group, resulted in 
considerable differences in memory performance, behavioral risk, and judgmental 
certainty. In study 1, participants were faster and more accurate at recognizing words 
that they attended to with similar others. In study 2, participants exhibited behavioral 
response biases that were more in line with the regulatory focus goals that they 
attended to with similar others. Finally, in study 3, participants’ judgmental certainty 
was more a function of the time pressure that they attended to with similar others. 
Participants attending with similar others did not report greater feelings of 
competition, task enjoyment, general motivation, positive affect, negative affect or 
arousal than participants attending with the control group. Yet, participants attending 
with similar others did feel more social than participants attending with the control 
group. As such, it appears that the manipulation was strong enough to prime the 
presence of one’s group, but subtle enough to avoid altering important emotional and 
motivational states.  
Given that everyday experiences are infused with far stronger in-group 
contexts than utilized in these experiments, it is conceivable that social attention plays 
a foundational role in the formation of knowledge, facilitating success in intra-group 
coordination and inter-group competition. While Social Attention Theory has broad 
implications for group functioning, it is first and foremost a theory of individual 
cognition and its social foundations. As such, implications for social influence 
scholarship as well as the psychological field in general are reviewed next.  
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Social Attention and Social Facilitation 
 Some of the earliest research in social psychology demonstrated that the mere 
presence of others can enhance performance (Triplett, 1898). However, evidenc also 
accumulated for the opposite hypothesis, where the presence of others impeded 
performance (e.g., Hunt & Hillery, 1973). Resolving the controversy, Zajonc (1965) 
argued that the mere presence of others increases general arousal that my either 
enhance or impede performance depending on the difficulty of the task. Baron (1986) 
proposed an alternative explanation, arguing that the presence of others leads to 
attentional conflict which leads selective focusing of attention which again can either 
enhance or hinder performance depending on information-processing demands of the 
task. Other accounts of social facilitation effects are more motivational in nature, 
positing that greater performance in the company of others is a function of self-
presentation motives, evaluation apprehension and fear of disapproval (cf. Geen, 
1991).  
 Social Attention Theory offers another account of social facilitation that 
centers on the experience of sharing attention with one’s group. According to the 
theory, attending to stimuli with one’s group should result in greater stimuli 
accessibility, and if stimuli accessibility is facilitative of performance, greater 
performance should result. Indeed, the first study described can be interpreted as a 
test of the social attention account of social facilitation. Given the null aros l check 
findings in study 3, a difference in arousal across conditions was unlikely. Also, given 
that participants were not able to see one another, the observed findings cannot be 
explained by differences in attentional distraction due to observing others or 
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differences in social anxiety due to being observed by others. Although not mutually 
exclusive with other accounts of social facilitation, Social Attention Theory offers a 
novel explanation for when certain others may influence individual performance.  
Social Attention and Social Identity 
The social identity/self-categorization approach to cognition has been 
extremely influential in modern social psychology. The perspective has been used to 
shed light on such phenomena as group polarization (Mackie, 1986; Turner, 
Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989), crowd behavior (Postmes & Spears, 1998; Reicher, 
Spears, and Postmes, 1995), leader preference (Hogg, 2001; Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 
1998) and of course, general social influence (Turner, 1991, 1999). Indeed, the 
perspective’s wide-ranging explanatory power stems from a profoundly simple 
insight—when an individual self-categorizes in a specific group, the beliefs and 
attitudes that are perceived to be prototypical to that group govern behavior. The 
principle remains the same whether it explains the tendency to shift to the position 
favored by the group in group polarization research, crowd behavior, leader 
preference or general social influence.  
In sum, according to the self-categorization perspective, individuals think and 
act according to the beliefs and attitudes of their active identity. How does Social
Attention Theory expand the understanding of self-categorization and its power to 
affect cognition and behavior? Like Self-categorization Theory (Turner, 1999), Social 
Attention Theory posits that individual identification with a group has powerful 
consequences for cognition and behavior. However, Social Attention Theory makes 
the novel assertion that the impact of identifying with a group goes beyond activating 
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beliefs and attitudes. Indeed, the three studies described primed social identities 
(color groups) with few associated beliefs or attitudes in order to test whether 
attending with one’s group has consequences for cognition beyond the belief and 
attitude activation. Even if the minimal groups primed activated certain beliefs and 
attitudes, it is highly unlikely that these beliefs and attitudes would systematically 
effect performance in study 1, behavioral riskiness in study 2 and judgmental 
certainty in study 3. As such, the studies suggest that the mere awareness that we are 
attending to words, goals, and time pressure, renders words, goals, and time pressure 
more cognitively accessible.  
Social Attention and the Formation of Norms 
 Merriam-Webster dictionary (2009) defines a norm as “an authoritative 
standard” or “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group…” As 
such, norms are by definition standards of behavior that “…guide, control, or regulate 
proper and acceptable behavior.” It is then no accident that social psychologists have 
been preoccupied with understanding the foundations of norm formation. Indeed, 
from the classics of social psychology (Asch, 1951; Sherif, 1936) to research on 
group polarization (Stoner, 1961) and groupthink (Janis, 1972), to more recent 
scholarship on shared reality (Echterhoff, Higgins & Levine, in press) and 
psychological foundations of culture (Lau, Chiu & Lee, 2001; Shteynberg, Gelfand, 
Kim, 2009), social psychological scholarship has repeatedly asked the same question: 
How are norms formed?  
 The prevailing social psychological answer, rooted in the aforementioned 
social verification (Festinger, 1950) and self-categorization (Turner et al., 1986; 
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Turner, 1991) perspectives, is the psychological readiness to accept the beliefs and 
attitudes of one’s group members as valid. As James put it (1907), “You accept my 
verification of one thing. I yours of another. We trade on each other’s truths” (p. 145). 
It is that reciprocity of acceptance that eventually creates a norm, an authoritative 
standard of what is correct, moral and good. How does Social Attention Theory 
contribute to this understanding of norm formation? 
Social Attention Theory offers an account of norm formation that is not based 
on the internalization of shared beliefs and attitudes. The theory proposes that norm 
formation in groups operates on yet another psychological foundation—that of social 
attention. For instance, according to Social Attention Theory, in order for high time 
pressure to become a norm, the individual does not need to believe that his or her 
group internalized the high time pressure; rather, it is only necessary that the 
individual knowingly attends to the high time pressure with his or her group. Indeed, 
in the third study described, participants had no way of knowing what the similar 
others or the control group thought about the high time pressure prime. That is, 
participants in the similar others attending condition had no basis on which to believe 
that similar others would be more or less accepting of high time pressure than they 
would be personally. The participants in the similar others attending condition only 
knew that they were attending to the high time pressure with similar others. Social 
Attention Theory contends that this relatively simple attentional mechanism can result 
in the formation of behaviorally-guiding high time pressure norm. 
Importantly, the social attention mechanism of norm formation greatly 
expands the number of stimuli that can be thought of as normative. Social Attention 
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Theory posits that any stimulus in the attentional field has the potential to become 
normative. For instance, as study 1 illustrates, simple words are better rem mbered 
when attended to with similar others. It is not a stretch to say that these words have 
become more normative due to their greater cognitive accessibility. Indeed, social 
groups often have explicit and implicit standards for what constitutes acceptable 
vocabulary. Social Attention Theory argues that simply attending to stimuli such as 
words with one’s group heightens their cognitive accessibility, rendering them more 
normative or acceptable. In sum, the theory posits that physical and social 
environments in their entirety, can be experienced as normative.  
The Social Psychology of Cognition  
The extant social psychological approach to knowledge formation is rooted in 
the notion of cognitive consistency. A theoretical staple for social psychologists (e.g., 
Abelson & Rosenberg, 1958; Festinger, 1957; Heider 1946; Wyer, 1974), the topic 
has been given new life by more recent theorizing in the connectionist paradigm (cf. 
Read, Vanman & Miller, 1997). In particular, parallel constraint satisfacton (e.g., 
Schultz & Lepper, 1996; Simon & Holyoak, 2002; Simon, Snow, & Stephen, 2004) 
and cellular automata models (e.g., Nowak, Vallacher, Tesser, & Borkowski, 2000) of 
human cognition propose that human knowledge is a web of interconnected 
knowledge structures, with each knowledge structure having a degree of consistency 
or coherence with the rest. Essentially new knowledge is accepted to the extent that 
such additions bring greater coherence to the overall knowledge network (Thagard, 
1989). As such, according to this perspective, the cognitive accessibility of a stimulu  
depends on how well it fits in with the rest of the individual’s knowledge or, even 
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more specifically, how applicable the stimulus is to the knowledge that is acce sible 
at the moment of stimuli consideration (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1996).  
The connectionist perspective is highly flexible, with the ability to model 
social verification and self-categorization approaches to knowledge formati n. For 
instance, in modeling the social verification perspective, it can be argued that some 
judgments are more readily accepted due to their greater consistency with existing 
beliefs about the source of the judgment (i.e., I trust X, therefore I should believe Y). 
Similarly, in modeling the self-categorization perspective, it can be argued that some 
judgments are more readily accepted due to their greater consistency with exist ng 
beliefs about the self (i.e., I am a member of group X, group X believes Y, therefore I 
believe Y). In sum, despite the utility of both social verification and self-
categorization perspectives in understanding social influence processes, both theories 
can be modeled by the connectionist approach to knowledge formation.  
Though generally more theoretical integration is desirable to less, the ability
to account for social influence processes through the connectionist architecture gives 
credence to the criticism that social psychology is a cognitive psychology with social 
stimuli (Ickes & Gonzales, 1994). The implication being that social psychology is an 
applied branch of cognitive psychology, not a basic science. This concern has 
motivated some scholars to consider changing the level of social psychological 
analysis to the group level (e.g., Ickes & Gonzales, 1994; Thompson & Fine, 1999), 
shifting the theoretical focus from what happens within interacting individuals to 
what happens in-between interacting individuals. Social Attention Theory offers yet 
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another way forward, retaining the focus on individual cognition, but introducing a 
fundamentally social dimension to knowledge formation.  
As discussed, according to the connectionist paradigm, a knowledge 
structure’s degree of consistency with already existing knowledge determines its 
adoption. However, in the experiments presented, participants internalized stimuli in 
the absence of any systematically activated beliefs and attitudes. As such, participants 
attending to with one’s group had no greater reason upon which to judge the stimuli 
as less or more consistent with or applicable to their existing knowledge.  
At this point, it is important to clearly distinguish between theoretical 
rationale and individual reasoning. Social Attention Theory has a theoretical ra onale 
that explains why attending to stimuli with one’s group would result in greater 
knowledge formation. However, the theory does not posit that greater social attention 
causes the individuals themselves, as thinking agents, to have greater reasons for 
knowledge adoption. For instance, the theoretical rationale of inclusive fitness 
suggests that humans seek sexual intercourse because it leads to genetic survival; 
however, we would not expect individuals to have genetic survival on their minds as 
the reason for seeking sexual intercourse. Similarly, although there is a theoretical 
rationale for why greater social attention leads to greater knowledge formation, 
participants in the similar others attending condition had no greater reason for 
knowledge formation. That is, the presented stimuli were not more cognitively 
accessible because they were more consistent with or applicable to extant knowledge, 
but rather, the presented stimuli were more cognitively accessible because they were 
perceived as social.  
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Future Directions. Social Attention Theory opens up many avenues for future 
research. First, it is important to examine the processes underpinning the influence of 
social attention on memory in more detail. It is possible that the influence of social 
attention on stimuli accessibility is the result of greater attentional f cus on stimuli 
that are experienced as shared with one’s group. In other words, when individuals 
know that a stimulus in their attention is also attended to by their group, they intensify 
their attention on that stimulus. Attentional intensity was not measured in the three 
studies presented and can be investigated with eye-tracking technology. Alternatively, 
it is possible that the influence of social attention on stimuli accessibility s not 
mediated by greater attentional intensity. It is conceivable that the exp rience of 
sharing attention on a stimulus with one’s group leads directly to greater cognitive 
accessibility of that stimulus. Imaging technologies can prove useful in investigating 
whether greater neural activation in the brain regions associated with shared attention 
(e.g., ventral mPFC) are associated with greater activation in the brain regions 
associated with memory (e.g., hippocampus). 
Second, it is important to examine how the size of the group with whom one 
attends influences the cognitive accessibility of stimuli. That is, does knowingly 
attending to a stimulus with a larger group make it more cognitively accessible than 
attending to the same stimulus with a smaller group? The answer to this queston may 
have particularly interesting implications in today’s world of mass media, where 
individuals are routinely aware that what they see, hear and read is being 
simultaneously attended to by millions of others.  
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Third, it is important to examine how the degree of social identification with 
the attending group impacts stimuli accessibility. For instance, assuming that one 
identifies with his or her family more than his or her work group, is knowingly 
attending to a stimulus with one’s family make the stimulus more cognitively 
accessible than attending to the same stimulus with one’s work group? Social 
Attention Theory would predict that this would be the case.  
Fourth, future research must examine whether the social attention effect 
generalizes across a wider array of stimuli. For instance, Social Attention Theory 
would predict that attending to mood stimuli (e.g., happy or sad faces) with one’s 
group would drive changes in mood; whereas, attending to behavioral mannerisms 
(e.g., yawning, scratching) with one’s group would change behavior.  
Fifth, it is important to note that the social attention effect is not limited to the 
visual system. An individual can gain knowledge of joint attention with his or her 
group through any sensory modality. For instance, it would be interesting to examin  
whether knowingly attending to a sound with one’s group (e.g., a speech accent) 
would make that sound more cognitively accessible, leading to accent reproduction. 
Overall, the influence of social attention on spoken language acquisition merits
further examination.  
Limitations. The lack of a direct measure of social attention is a significant 
limitation of the studies presented. Because the experience of social attention is 
implicit, it is difficult to capture it through self-report measures. Asking participants 
whether they experienced the stimuli as social or shared is more likely to confuse 
them than yield meaningful data. Another limitation of the present research is the 
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potentially artificial nature of the similar others attending manipulation. It should be 
noted, however, that the subtlety of the laboratory prime utilized effectively 
prevented changes in motivation or arousal as well as activation of strong beliefs or 
attitudes. For instance, if gender-based groups were used, it is possible that th
priming of the male identity would have activated a promotion orientation, while the 
priming of the female identity would have activated a prevention orientation.  
Conclusion. Social Attention Theory offers a novel approach to understanding 
knowledge formation that is consistent with scholarship on group-selection models of 
evolution and group locomotion, the role of joint attention behavior in early learning, 
as well as the functionally unique neurological basis of shared attention. Although no 
theory can be proved certain, the three studies presented support the social attention 
account of knowledge formation. As reviewed, Social Attention Theory has important 
implications for social psychological research on social facilitation, social identity, 
and norm formation. Also, the perspective forwarded here questions whether the 
formation of new knowledge is based solely on its degree of coherence with, or 
applicability to, existing knowledge structures. Rather, it is argued that knowledge 
formation rests on yet another psychological foundation, one that is rooted in the 
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